But mind is not inevitable. The rest of us has an evolutionary history of many millions of years. Metaphorically speaking, it is hard wired. Mind is not. It is new, having evolved only about a hundred thousand years ago. 1, 2 The human mind is merely a propensity, a tendency to its emergence. It needs help from the social world to bring it to fruition. 3 The first form of this help comes in the form of a game that mothers play with their babies simply to amuse themselves and their babies. We will come to its nature later.
How we happen to have our kind of mind is a mystery. It is a mystery that many authorities, from many different disciplines, have tried to solve. I think it can be said that at the least, the mystery is only partly solved. Some of the main people in this field of inquiry have approached the problem as if it were simply a matter of changes in the brain, as if evolution does not take place in relation to the environment, which, in the later stages of evolution, includes the social environment. 4 In order to begin a quest for the origins of the human mind, we need to discover what it is that is central to our kind of mind that distinguishes it from the minds of the creatures who are closest to us, the chimpanzees. Since chimpanzees cannot tell us about their mental life, we have to rely on observations of behaviour in order to infer the difference between them and us. This is what ethologists and primatologists did during the twentieth century. Many of them concluded that there are no essential differences between humans and the higher primates, only differences of degree. The capacity for language, for example, once thought to be uniquely human, we now know is not. 5 Also tool use, traditionally considered the hallmark of the human, is not confined to humans. Chimpanzees can use objects in the environment in the way we use tools. 6 Furthermore, as Darwin pointed out, our basic emotional expressions are very similar. 7 The ethologists, however, chose to ignore as artefactual what was staring them in the face. It was culture. This vast system that surrounds us, in which we live, which we have created, and which in part creates us, is the outstanding difference between humankind and other primates.
The great figures who have arrived at this conclusion, such as the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, 8 and the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 9 have identified, in their extensive formulations, the central fact of culture. It is the symbol. The mind that can create culture is one that can use a symbol.
So what is a symbol? First, it differs from a sign. A sign indicates something. It points to it. A dark cloud is a sign of rain. A red light is a sign to stop. Words are signs.
Monkeys can use words, their own words, but they use them only as signs. 5 Whereas signs point to things, symbols depict. Their main function is to represent what cannot otherwise be pictured, such as feelings and rather nebulous ideas. The word 'cloud', which in its basic usage is a sign, can be used as a symbol, as in the sentence, 'His last years were clouded by the loss of his wife'. A certain feeling state is depicted by means of resemblance to the cloud.
If we can accept that the symbol is necessary to the kind of mind that is capable of creating culture, we are led to the notion that if we can discover how symbol use emerges in an individual life, we can at the same time infer the discovery of mind. 10 We now return to the game between mother and child referred to earlier. It is a necessary starting point in the child's developmental journey towards the capacity to symbolize. Like the symbol, its cardinal feature is resembling. 10 The game usually begins when nothing else is happening, and when the baby is not distressed. The mother pretends to have a conversation with her baby. This quasi-conversation is fairly well established by three months, when the baby can take part in the game. An interplay is created between them, made of their voices, facial expressions and body movements, which in its rhythms and reciprocity, 11, 12 is like an adult conversation. It has been called a proto-conversation. 13 In it, the mother shows, in the melodic contours of her voice, the 'shape' of what her baby feels at that moment. She uses her voice, as a poet does, to convey feeling. The effect is compounded by the expression on her face and in her body. She portrays a resemblance of her baby's immediate state of mind.
It is important that the mother's portrayal 'fits' the baby's state. The experience of 'fit' 14 creates pleasure for both of them, and the sense that they are connected, as if two parts of a single system, a unified doubleness. This is the structure of the symbol. 10 Typically, a symbol, of which metaphor is the archetype, brings together by resemblance two different kinds of reality. Something in the world, like a cloud, is used to portray something not in the world, like a feeling. When I talk in this way, about the cloud, and the man who lost his wife, I hold within my own mind, a unified doubleness.
I am suggesting that the first form of this inner doubling is created first in the outer world between two people, the mother and child in the proto-conversation. 10, 14 The proto-conversation predicts, and is a forerunner of, the child being able to engage in a later kind of pretend play, which has been called symbolic, 15 but is better called proto-symbolic. It is well developed by the age of three. In this game, the child is playing with toys or other things, chattering, apparently oblivious of other people, as if having a conversation with himself or herself, and someone else as well, who is not there. 16 It is as if the doubling of the earlier proto-conversation has been internalized. Furthermore, the child behaves as if she has taken over the mother's picturing function. Whereas in the proto-conversation it had been the mother who showed the baby that baby's feeling state, now the child creates this resemblance for itself. 10 As the child chatters, it tells a story, using objects having shapes resembling the elements of the story, for example, a stick for a man, a large leaf for a boat. The story represents, in a quasi-symbolic way, an aspect of the child's personal existence. It is as if, to repeat, the child has internalized and taken over for itself, the essential features of the original, pretend conversation -its doubling, and its representation, by resemblance, of a potential inner state.
True symbolization emerges perhaps a year later, at about four, when the child can use words, not merely as signs, but as symbols, in language, free of the resembling objects. At this stage, the child displays the first form of that kind of consciousness, the structure of mind that is believed to be unique to the human primate. It is one of unified and co-ordinated doubleness. The child now understands the concept of a secret. It knows that it lives, simultaneously, in two different spaces, one private and the other public. 17 Infants who have been deprived of the original protoconversation, in various ways, including trauma, are relatively impeded in this developmental progression. They cannot do pretend play. Symbols are beyond them. They are predisposed to live a diminished existence, and an often painful stunting of personality development.
When the child discovers the use of symbols, on the other hand, he or she becomes a cultural creature, able to participate in the vast project of humankind that is expressed in endless ways -not just in mathematics, love songs and hymns, but in ordinary relating. We can say that symbols are the coins of intimacy, since they enable us to share our feelings with others. They create connections between people.
So, an apparently trivial game, played by mothers for fun, without being told to, is of extraordinary consequence. Playing the game, it seems, activates the propensity of humans to develop the special kind of consciousness that is unique to us, which is double, and which gives rise to the cultural system. Now, to a final question: 'How did the proto-conversation evolve?' I suggest that it contributed to the baby's survival through the pleasure it gave the mother. She had to care for a helpless infant, born relatively immature because of its big brain, long beyond the period of nurture required by other primates whose care is driven by the long-evolved system of attachment. The pleasure of their interplay created, I am supposing, the extra incentive necessary to maintain a prolonged burden of care.
An evolutionary scenario now emerges in which babies had a tendency to survive, relative to those who did not, when they, with their mothers, could between them create pleasure in an interplay between voices and faces. Through a process of natural selection, the brains of mothers and babies evolved as if peculiarly designed for the proto-conversational game. Most of humanity has inherited, to a greater or lesser degree, the analogical style of this specific interpersonal play. 10 This piece, slightly modified, was recorded on 8 July 2016 and was broadcast on the ABC science show Ockham's Razor, of which Dr Robyn Williams is the Director. The talk is published here with his kind permission.
Conclusions
A restorative and generative kind of relatedness is natural, the propensity for it being given to us by our biological heritage. Its first form is a game between babies and caregivers, a proto-conversation. Principles derived from this, and related developmental behaviours, guide a form of therapeutic relatedness consisting of an interactive, to-and-fro patterning of verbal pictures, or analogues, of the subject's immediate experience. The analogue is the first form of symbol, the use of which is the hallmark of the human.
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